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Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets 
with Insider Information: An Application of 
Rational-Expectations Models 
Charles R. Plott 
California Institute of Technology 
Shyam Sunder 
University of Minnesota 
The study reports on the ability of competing models of market 
information integration and dissemination to explain the behavior of 
simple laboratory markets for a one-period security. Returns to the 
security depended upon a randomly drawn state of nature. Some 
agents (insiders), whose identity was unknown to other agents, knew 
the state before the markets opened. With replication of market 
conditions the predictions of a fully revealing rational-expectations 
model are relatively accurate. Prices adjusted immediately to near 
rational-expectations prices; profits of insiders were virtually indis- 
tinguishable from noninsiders; and efficiency levels converged to 
near 100 percent. 
I. Introduction 
This study reports on the behavior of five markets created in a 
laboratory environment to explore some theoretical implications of 
insider information. Recently, principles of rational expectations have 
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Foundation, and the Caltech Program for Enterprise and Public Policy is gratefully 
acknowledged. We have benefited from many conversations with Robert Forsythe and 
James Jordan. We would also like to thank Stanley Reiter whose comments led to 
experiment 5. 
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been extended to theories of the allocative properties of securities 
markets. The resulting models deviate substantially from traditional 
demand and supply models and have important consequences for 
social policies regarding market organization and control. Because of 
the possibly subtle and complex role played by information and ex- 
pectations in market activity, the models are hard to test, and many 
aspects of them remain controversial. 
We have attempted to create laboratory markets which are 
sufficiently simple to allow a clearer glimpse of the inherently com- 
plex phenomena of information utilization and dissemination within 
a market. We do not attempt to evaluate the models as applied to the 
U.S. securities markets or any other complicated, naturally occurring 
market. Our goal is only to determine the appropriateness of various 
models for predicting the behavior of very simple markets with the 
hope that the understanding gained will be useful in ascertaining 
features of models which will have successful applications to more 
complex markets.1 
Security markets have two important dimensions. The first is time 
in the sense that securities yield a stream of cash over time. An inquiry 
about the nature of this first dimension, by using laboratory tech- 
niques, was initiated by Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (forthcoming). 
The second dimension, uncertainty, is explored in this study by 
abstracting the time dimension and focusing on a security with only a 
one-period life. Several competing modes of thought can be applied 
to predict the price of this security. Because it can be traded for 
capital gains, theories of pure speculation (notably Keynes 1936; also 
Harrison and Kreps 1978) maintain that the prospect of speculative 
returns can dominate the underlying returns or intrinsic value of the 
security. The price might wander over a wide range of values or 
possibly "explode." At the other extreme are strong versions of 
rational-expectations theories which assert that market prices adjust 
instantaneously to equilibrium price levels which reflect at least all 
available information about the state of nature. In the case of the 
"crystal ball" hypothesis the equilibrium may reflect even more in- 
formation than the sum of what is available to individual participants. 
Differences among some models turn on the role played by price 
itself in conveying information about the state of nature. On one 
hand are fully revealing rational-expectations (RE) equilibria (see 
Lucas 1972 and Green 1973) in which prices in equilibrium reveal the 
'We cannot claim that we have tested any of the models found in the literature. All 
models are accompanied by technical assumptions and qualifications which are not 
present in the simple markets we created. These markets may be used to test these 
models only if such assumptions are placed in an "as if" category and are not taken 
literally. 
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state because they must be consistent with the expectations individuals 
have about the state of nature when they face those prices. On the 
other hand are the prior-information (PI) equilibria which hold that 
individuals do not condition expectations upon price. Instead, ex- 
pectations are exogenous to the price formation process with indi- 
viduals utilizing whatever prior information they might have at their 
disposal. With expectations formed, prices are determined by a 
straightforward application of the principles of demand and supply as 
in a Walrasian system. 
In the sections below we report on five markets. The results of the 
first experiment, in which some insiders were given less than certain 
information about the state of nature before trading began, provided 
little support for the RE model. Since our own expectations leaned in 
favor of prior-information equilibrium, we designed the second mar- 
ket to give the RE model the best chance against the PI model; 
insiders were given perfect information about the realized state be- 
fore trading began, thus allowing traders more opportunity to gain ex- 
perience over repeated occurrences of the state. The RE model per- 
formed well, with prices and allocations converging close to the fully 
revealing equilibrium. The next two markets involved replications 
without the experience with the certainty case, and the final market, 5, 
involved an increase in the number of states of nature from two to 
three. The RE model continued to predict well. 
The paper is developed as follows. In Section II the design of 
markets is discussed. In Section III our hypotheses are stated, and in 
Section IV they are reviewed in light of the results. In Section V other 
implications of the results are discussed in light of current mathe- 
matical models and the statistical models applied to the U.S. securities 
industry. The last section is a summary of conclusions. Details of 
experimental procedures which are at the heart of the market are 
outlined in the Appendix. 
II. Design of Markets 
Each market experiment involved several periods. In each period 
securities which had one-period lives were traded. Each security paid 
a single dividend to its holder at the end of the period. The dividend 
from holding a security differed across individuals (which could be 
analogous to different tax brackets or risk preferences) and depended 
upon the (randomly drawn) state of nature. Differences in dividends 
and possibly expectations led to the existence of gains from exchange 
2 Instead of being viewed as a security, the traded object could also be viewed as a 
resource being traded among the owners of alternative production technologies. 
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and market activity. The markets were organized as oral double 
auctions similar to those on the floor of the New York Stock Ex- 
change.3 
Subjects were students at the Graduate School of Business at the 
University of Chicago. In markets 1, 2, and 4 all subjects were inex- 
perienced in that none had previously participated in a laboratory 
market. Subjects in markets 3 and 5 had participated in one or more 
of the earlier markets. 
By following the accepted method for inducing preferences (Smith 
1976; Plott 1979) each individual subject, i, was assigned a dollar 
redemption function of the form RM = yi[ai + di(Ot)xt + SPit - IpPt 
+ Ct], ai < 0, di(O) > 0, yi > 0, xi - 0, where 
R( = dollar earnings of individual i in period t, 
xi = units held by i at the end of period t (all short sales were 
prohibited so x( - 0) is the sum of initial endowment of 
securities plus purchases less sales in period t, 
di(O) = dividend rate in francs for individual i and expressed as a 
function of the state of nature 0, 
1,Ps = revenue from sales of securities during period t, 
X Ppt = cost of securities purchased during period t, 
0Ef = possible states of nature, 
Ci = initial endowment of cash in francs, 
ai = fixed cost in francs, and 
hYi = conversion rate of francs into dollars. 
As long as an individual has a positive utility for money, he or she 
would like R( as large as possible. This motivation systematically in- 
duces values on the securities by virtue of derived demand theory. 
Such values can then be used as parameters on market models. 
As is implicit in the formula above, at the beginning of each period 
each individual was given an initial endowment of working capital (Ct) 
which was sufficiently large never to serve as a binding constraint on 
purchases of securities. Each individual was also given an initial en- 
dowment of securities (xi) at the beginning of each period. Since short 
sales were never permitted except as a reduction of an individual's 
initial endowment, there was a fixed supply of securities, XI. 
The initial endowment in the form of working capital and securities 
was frequently of substantial value. A fixed cost each period, ai < 0, 
was imposed to reduce the cost of the experiment. 
All trading was in francs. Use of francs allows flexibility in the 
3 Any buyer (seller) is free at any time to make an oral bid (offer) to buy (sell) one unit 
of the security at a designated price. Such bids and offers are publicly announced and 
recorded. Only one (the last) bid and offer are outstanding at any time. Sellers (buyers) 
are free to accept any public bid (offer) they wish. 
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choice of parameters while avoiding the technical problems inherent 
in using large dollar amounts. Francs have been successfully em- 
ployed in other experiments (Friedman 1967; Forsythe et al. forth- 
coming). 
All investors were aware of the mechanism used to determine the 
state of nature each period and had experience with its operation (see 
Instruction Set 1 in the Appendix for a description and table 1 for 
prior probabilities used).4 At the beginning of trading each period, 
prior information of noninsiders about the state consisted solely of 
this knowledge. Certain investors became insiders by receiving a clue 
card bearing information about the realized state. Distribution of 
blank clue cards to noninsiders prevented the identity of the insiders 
from being revealed. 
The case where no individual received information about the 
realized state is called the "no-information" case. As shown in table 1, 
the first few periods of every market (the first four in 1, the first four 
in 2, the first two in 3, the first four and the last in 4, and the first three 
in 5) were conducted under the no-information condition. This con- 
dition served as both a training period and a period of calibration for 
experimental purposes, as will be discussed below. 
In periods 5 and 6 of market 2, all investors were privately given 
clues in order to let agents learn about the price/state correspondence 
prior to their conducting operations in less informed environments. 
The results suggested that this type of training was unnecessary for 
the successful application of RE models. This was confirmed in mar- 
kets 3, 4, and 5. 
In most periods of all markets only one-half (two out of four) of the 
agents from each dividend (preference) type received information 
about the realized state of nature. The design is displayed in table 1. 
This allowed simultaneous existence of insiders and noninsiders and 
the study of a market with asymmetric distribution of information. 
The results of market 1 suggested that the markets may adjust to 
the general pattern of information in the market. But some replica- 
tion may be necessary for each information pattern before equilib- 
4Even though individuals were trained, we still had no way of knowing their subjec- 
tive probabilities. 
5In market 1 only one out of three investors of each type was an insider, and the 
information received by insiders was less than certain. The "clue" given to the insiders 
was a sample of 10 draws with replacement. The sample was taken from urn X 
containing balls marked "O" and "I" [pr(O |X) = 4/5, pr(I X) = 1/5] if the state 
randomly chosen wasX and the sample was drawn from urn Y [pr(O I Y) = 3/5, pr(I I Y) 
= 2/5] if the randomly chosen state was Y. The samples given to the three insiders are 
shown in table 1 together with the Bayesian posterior probabilities of the state, given 
the sample. If the insiders were perfect Bayesians, then their subjective probabilities of 
the state, given the information they received, would be those in the table. 
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rium is finally established for that information pattern. A reduction in 
the number of different information patterns would thus result in a 
reduction of periods necessary to see equilibrating behavior should it 
exist. In all markets after market 1 (periods 5 through 11 in market 2, 
3 through 12 in market 3, and so forth) the information contained on 
the clue card received by the insiders indicated the realized state of 
nature with certainty. 
Information that everyone knows publicly (as opposed to privately) 
is called "common knowledge" (Aumann 1976). Since the instructions 
were read publicly, each agent knew what other agents knew from 
that source. In particular, every agent knew that no one knew the 
number or the identity of insiders. The exceptions are periods 1 
through 4 of market 1, 1 through 4 of market 2, 1 through 3 of 
market 5, in all of which the fact that no one had any information was 
announced, and also in period 11 of market 1 in which the clue was 
publicly announced. Additional common knowledge of possible im- 
portance was that the clues of all insiders were identical. From the 
nature of the instructions, agents could deduce in all but market 1 
that the dividend values for every agent remained constant from 
period to period. Agents did not know the number of agent types, 
although in markets 3, 4, and 5 they were told that the dividends of 
others may differ from their own (in 1 and 2 nothing was said), and 
they did not know that the insiders were the same agents throughout 
the relevant periods. 
The dividend parameters for all markets are summarized in table 2. 
Agents in each experiment were partitioned into three types (desig- 
nated as I, II, and III) according to dividend returns. There were 
four agents of each type except in market 1, where there were three. 
This provided markets with 12 agents except market 1, in which there 
were nine. Each period each agent had an initial endowment of two 
certificates, giving a market supply of 24 units (18 for market 1). In 
addition, each period each agent was given 10,000 francs in working 
capital which was returned to the experimenter at the end of the 
period by the imposition of a fixed cost of 10,000 francs. The conver- 
sion rates of dollars per franc are in table 2. 
The dividends, paid at the end of the period, differed by agent type 
and according to the state of nature. Reading table 2 we can see that in 
market 1 there are two possible states, X and Y. An agent of type I 
receives 150 francs for every certificate held if the state is X and 350 
francs per certificate if the state is Y. The dividends for other types 
and other markets are determined similarly. For example, in market 5 
there are three possible states (X, Y, and Z), and an agent of type I 
receives dividends per certificate of 120, 170, or 320 francs, depend- 
ing upon whether the state is X, Y, or Z. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 15:07:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
- caJ- O'JcrJ- ( rc t- tc b 
v~~~~~~~~ C) Cj in ooooo 
H N . 
C) C C) I~n 
t In C) ) t t t - < CT It ' 
. 
..... ... *.- 0 
* N ; : ; : ; : : ; : : 
0 
: ooo~~~CI coo o c o ocn 
-q cli -Gq G4 C C Gq C _, Gn GM _I -_t _I l I 
I~ = N CM Gq CJ G 
HS :6 
H Zoooooooo 0
H v 
z X 
- N 
z 
zH 
671 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 15:07:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
672 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
The prior probabilities of states and the dividends were chosen so 
that the prices and allocations predicted by competing models would 
reasonably be separated. The final column gives the expected value of 
a certificate for a given type of agent based on the prior probabilities. 
III. Models 
We focus on two competing ideas. The first is the PI equilibrium 
(Walrasian) hypothesis and the second is the RE equilibrium hypothe- 
sis. For completeness, however, a third set of three models will be 
mentioned. 
The PI equilibrium hypothesis has been the traditional vehicle for 
incorporating uncertainty into market and other economic models. 
Each individual, i, is provided with endowment of securities, xi, a 
priori information, pi(O), about the state of nature 0. Demand func- 
tions, xi = D'(p, xi), are then generated from the theory that individu- 
als attempt to 
max E u1(xi, 0)pi(0) subject top(xi - xi) = 0. 
Xi 
Prices are determined by the law of supply and demand 
D (p,xi) - xi= 0. 
i i 
For the market settings and parameters described for the experi- 
ments above, the application of this model is straightforward. In the 
absence of risk aversion, at any price below the expected dividend 
value, agents will demand as many units as their working capital will 
buy. At prices above the expected dividend value, agents will sell the 
two units initially endowed and would sell more if short sales were 
permitted. In the absence of risk aversion, market demand will thus 
be "horizontal" until the capital constraint becomes binding as shown 
in figure 1, and the demand price will equal the expected dividend 
value of the agent type with the maximum expected dividend. Supply 
is limited by the initial endowments. 
The predictions of this model for various states and information 
conditions imposed across all experiments, under the assumption of 
risk neutrality, are summarized in table 3. These figures are taken from 
table 2 by determining the type of agent who has the maximum 
expected value. The model predicts both price and final allocations. 
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Price 
di = max edi __|_l 
dil 
di = min edI 
. 
I I I 
E N1il E (N1il +Nl) WI WI +W 11 WI + W1l +Will 
di dil dill 
Total Net Trades 
FIG. 1.-Supply and demand functions: Wi = initial working capital of investors of 
type i; Ni = number of agents in the market of dividend type i; E = initial endowment 
of securities per agent; di = dividend of agents of dividend type i; E = mathematical 
expectation with respect to the prior probability distribution of the states of nature. 
For example, in market 2 the price will be 266 in state X because 
uninformed agents of both types I and II have an expected value of 
266. All other agents have lower expected values and should sell to 
these four agents who have a horizontal demand at that price. 
The second model is of RE equilibrium in which individuals condi- 
tion their expectations about the underlying state of nature upon the 
equilibrium values of the endogenous variables of the system. The 
equilibria themselves must be consistent with this type of adaptive 
behavior. A variety of models exist, depending upon the information 
conveyed to agents by the equilibrium values, the inference process of 
agents, etc. The setting we chose for the experimental markets is one 
in which agents are assumed to be risk neutral and prices are fully 
revealing. 
The RE equilibrium prices given states X, Y, and Z are not equal to 
each other. Therefore, individuals who have no external information 
about the state of nature but who observe all transactions should, 
according to the RE equilibrium models, infer the states of nature and 
adjust their behavior accordingly. The resulting predictions are also 
given in table 3. 
The critical differences between the price predictions of the two 
models occur when the expected value of the security based upon the 
prior information and dividends of the uninformed individuals lies 
above the RE equilibrium price. The RE expectations equilibrium 
models predict that such individuals will revise their expectations 
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downward, based on market-generated information, and allow the 
price to fall. 
The pattern of holdings predicted by the two models almost always 
differs. The RE model predicts that the uninformed individuals will 
behave the same as the insiders since market price here is fully 
revealing. Thus, the PI equilibrium predicts that only the insiders of a 
given type can hold, while the RE model predicts that all members of 
this type can hold. 
For convenience of exposition the competing predictions can be 
summarized by the following two hypotheses: 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Prices converge to the prior-information 
equilibrium values given in table 3. 
ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS 1: Prices converge to the 
rational-expectations equilibrium values given in table 3. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Security holdings converge to the 
prior-information equilibrium values given in table 3. 
ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS 2: Security holdings converge 
to the rational-expectations equilibrium values given in table 
3. 
Two additional measures, profit and efficiency, are relevant for 
separating the PI and RE models. If the market data are completely 
revealing of the state, then insider information is of no value. Thus, 
under the RE hypothesis insiders should make no more profit than 
uninformed individuals. In some respects this may be a better indi- 
cator of market-generated information than the final holdings. Risk- 
averse, uninformed individuals may reap the benefits of almost full 
information by selling to informed individuals at near equilibrium 
prices and avoid the risk of holding in the absence of certainty. The 
holdings data could then be used to reject the RE model even though 
the uninformed acted with very little uncertainty. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Profits of insiders are greater than the 
profits of the uninformed agents as implied by the prior- 
information equilibrium prices and allocations given in table 
3. 
ALTERNATE HYPOTHESIS 3: Profits of insiders and the 
uninformed agents converge to equality as implied by the 
rational-expectations equilibrium prices and allocations 
given in table 3. 
Plott and Smith (1978) used the fraction of consumer plus producer 
surplus (total profits in these markets) exploited as the measure of 
efficiency. Application of the concept to these markets is complicated 
by two considerations. First, under uncertainty the measure must be 
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ex ante with respect to the information which exists in the market. 
The following generalization seems to be appropriate: 
total expected returns to allocation, A, 
conditioned on available information 
in the market 
efficiency (E) = total expected return of rational 
expectations allocation, A, conditioned 
on information in the market 
_ R(A I) 
eR(A I) 
If the RE allocation yields the maximum which can be reasonably 
expected, this measure of efficiency is simply the expected value of 
the actual allocation taken as a percentage of that maximum. 
The second problem involves initial endowments. In the above 
sense the markets we studied are reasonably efficient even if no trade 
takes place. In order to emphasize this fact we have constructed a 
measure which is zero if no trading takes place. Let X be the no-trade 
allocation (i.e., the initial endowments): 
trading efficiency(TE) 
eR (A II) - (expected returns of X conditioned 
upon information in the market) 
eR (A II) - (expected returns of X conditioned 
upon information in the market) 
Because different models sometimes predict different allocations, 
the efficiency measure of the actual allocation when compared with 
the predicted efficiency can be used as a measure of the relative 
accuracy of competing models. Of course this measure defines the 
efficiency of the RE equilibrium allocation to be 100 percent. The 
efficiency of the PI equilibrium allocation differs from 100 only when 
certain events occur. Column 2 of table 4 lists the efficiency of the PI 
equilibrium allocation (both E and TE) for all information conditions 
in which such events occur. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: Measures of efficiency (E and TE) con- 
verge to the values given in column 2 of table 4 which are 
implied by the prior-information model. 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS 4: E and TE measures of effi- 
ciency converge to 100 percent in all cases as implied by the 
rational-expectations model. 
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TABLE 4 
EFFICIENCY MEASURES WHEN ALLOCATIONS PREDICTED BY Two MODELS DIFFER 
Under PI Under Actual Allocations Under RE 
Market and Equilibrium (Listed for Each Period Equilibrium 
Efficiency Allocations Chronologically) Allocations 
Measure (1) (2) (3) 
2 (state X): 
E 42 57, 70 100 
TE - 133 -72, -10 100 
3 (state Y): 
E 57 79, 88, 89, 98, 99 100 
TE -125 13, 38, 47, 88, 94 100 
4 (state Y): 
E 57 92, 95, 93, 94, 94 100 
TE -125 59, 72, 66, 69, 69 100 
5 (state X): 
E 67 82, 94, 100 100 
TE -112 -15, 65, 100 100 
Mean 
efficiency: 
E 57 88.3 100 
TE -123 45.5 100 
Norr.-Efficiency measures for market I which had probabilistic sample infOrmnation are not given in mrder to 
save space. E = efficiency measure; TE = trading efficiency measure; PI = prior infOrination; RE = rational 
expectations. 
Three ideas must be listed for completeness. First, Keynes (1936) 
suggests that speculation and the possibility of capital gains can cause 
prices to be unrelated to underlying returns and information. Taken 
literally this means that there is no systematic relationship between the 
state, the underlying returns, and information on one hand and the 
price and allocations on the other. Because all four pairs of hypoth- 
eses discussed above imply systematic relationships, we interpret 
Keynesian ideas as a rejection of all these hypotheses. 
Beja (1976) and Milgrom (1979) recognized that when price is a 
sufficient statistic for the state individuals who have any uncertainty at 
all about the underlying state can ignore all their private information, 
thereby yielding all prices in the range of the equilibrium-price corre- 
spondence as equilibria for all states of nature. This theoretical inde- 
terminacy is critically dependent on the existence of some uncer- 
tainty in all agents and, unlike the Keynes hypothesis, restricts the 
range of prices to the equilibrium set. If this indeterminacy is en- 
countered, prices should be at one of the RE equilibrium prices, but 
beyond that there need be no relationship between the state and 
the market variables such as price and allocations. 
The second is the strong version of the efficient-markets hypothesis 
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which suggests that prices adjust instantaneously to all available in- 
formation. Replication of time periods is unnecessary to establish 
equilibria. 
The third is the crystal-ball hypothesis which maintains that market 
adjustments reflect information beyond that held by agents. It is 
tempting to assert that the market will somehow know and then apply 
a model as if it does. This hypothesis would have markets converging 
to fully revealing equilibrium even when no agent has information 
beyond prior probabilities. 
IV. Results 
The time series of prices for all periods of all markets are shown in 
figures 2 through 6. Price predictions of the PI model when different 
from those of the RE equilibrium model are shown by the horizontal 
400 - 
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PERIOD (STATE) 
Fi(;. 3.-Market 2. Time series of contract prices 
dotted line. Predictions of the RE equilibrium model are shown by the 
horizontal solid line. Each dot represents one trade at the indicated 
price in chronological order. 
Hypotheses about prices, 1 and alternate 1, are tested in two steps, 
first against each other and then the winner against the random price 
behavior. Hypothesis 1 as well as the random-behavior hypothesis is 
rejected in favor of alternate hypothesis 1-that prices converge to 
the RE predictions. 
In step 1, across all periods of all markets, the price predictions of 
the competing models differed 17 times.6 In all but four periods 
average price is closer to the RE equilibrium than to the PI equilib- 
rium. Similarly, in 13 of the 17 periods the average absolute and 
6Market 1: periods 6, 8; market 2: periods 7, 9; market 3: periods 3, 5, 7, 8, 10; 
market 4: periods 5, 7, 8, 10, 12; market 5: periods 4, 5, 11. 
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squared deviations from the RE equilibrium are smaller than the 
corresponding deviations from the PI equilibrium. Further, and in 
general, the relative advantage of the RE over the PI model increases 
upon replication. The few cases where the PI model does better than 
the RE occur in the early states of experience acquisition. 
Market 5 was designed as a check on the robustness of the RE 
equilibrium model. Because the three-state situation is inherently 
more complicated, new theories can be developed to compete with the 
theory of fully revealing prices. In particular, we thought the market 
might reveal only part of the available information. That is, it may 
reveal that nature has not chosen some state as opposed to revealing 
exactly which state was chosen. In the two-state world, revelation of 
one state which is not chosen is equivalent to complete state revela- 
tion. The three-state world is different. The maximum expected 
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TABLE 5 
NUMBER OF CERTIFICATES IN WRONG HANDS 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS VERSUS PRIOR INFORMATION HYPOTHESIS 
Mr Total Number Period Cert if icates 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
~~~~~~~Realized State Y Y X Y Y X* Y Y* Y X Y 
1 18 Rational Expectations 1 12 0 8 
O 2 2 3 0 2 1 
Prior Expectations 8 4 7 4 
Realized State X X Y Y Y Y X* Y X* Y Y 
Rational Expectations 1 22 0 12 0 0 
O 2 0 -I 0 0 
Prior Expectations 4 5 23 5 7 
Real ized State X Y Y* X Y* Y* X Y* X Y* Y X 
3 24 
Rational Expectations 18 0 10 9 0 2 0 2 
R~11~dNL~R~ A 0 it N 2 5, N 5 y 0 Y~0 0 Prior Expectations 15 8 19 19 11 24 6 24 
Realized State X Y Y X Y* X Y* Y* X Y* X Y* X Y 
4 24 
Rational Expectations 7 0 3 5 0 4 0 4 0 
Prior Expectations 21 2 21 21 2 21 0 21 2 
Real ized State Z. X Z X* X* Y Z Z Y Y X* Y Z 
24 Rational Expectations 1 13 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Prior Expectations 11 20 13 5 0 7 9 24 11 14 
*Allocations predicted by the two models are disjoint. See Table 3. 
values of uninformed agents will be 192 for the type II uninformed 
investors if the information is "not Z," 222 and 262 for type I investors 
if the information is "not Y" and "not X," respectively. As is shown on 
the price time series, prices never approach these values in periods in 
which they might be predicted. The RE model applies to the three- 
state environment as readily as to the two-state environment. 
In the second step, alternate hypothesis 1 was compared with the 
random-price-behavior hypothesis. Out of 398 nonzero price changes 
in the five markets, 284 were in the direction of RE equilibrium price. 
Since under random behavior only one-half of these changes would 
be expected to move the price in the direction of RE price, the 
probability of the observed behavior being generated by random 
chance is practically zero (8.5 SD away from the mean). Similar statis- 
tics are obtained by testing for convergence of mean squared error 
and mean absolute deviation from RE price toward zero upon rep- 
lication. 
Hypothesis 2 can be rejected in favor of its alternative. Each model 
predicts the type of agents who will hold the certificates. Table 5 lists 
the number of certificates in the wrong hands from the point of view 
of each model. The RE equilibrium model is clearly superior to the PI 
model. The models' predictions differ in 36 of the 61 periods in the 
price markets. In 29 of these 36 periods error from allocations pre- 
dicted by the RE model is smaller. In 18 of the 36 periods the RE 
model made no errors at all. The PI model made zero errors in only 
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TABLE 6 
NET PROFIT OF INFORMED AGENTS AS A PERCENT OF 
NET PROFIT OF UNINFORMED AGENTS 
Realized Period 
Market State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 00 11 12 13 14 
X 68 147 -53 
Y 108 88 110 118 118 91 109 8 
X 85 105 6208 267 
Y 107 115 100 103 107 109 105 
X 76 100 103 101 100 
Y 97'9 230 129 137 102 93 99 
X 111 152 178 142 130 117 
Y 108 109 128 123 118 119 113 90 
X 121 147 115 105 
5 Y 141 102 101 100 
Z 69 100 157 135 97 
There was no difference in information provided to various individuals during periods covered 
by hatched boxes. Figures are given for control. 
two out of these 36 periods. In 17 periods predicted allocations were 
disjoint (marked by *), and in 12 of the 17 the error rate for the RE 
model was lower and all five exceptions occurred during the early 
adjustment periods. 
An examination of the trading activities of the uninformed agents 
in periods when others were informed is particularly useful. When 
the two models make contradictory predictions about their trading 
activity, behavior of the uninformed tends to conform to the PI model 
in early periods, but upon replication, as the experience is gained, the 
RE model dominates the PI.7 Note that the behavior of uninformed 
individuals in contradiction to the PI model implies that these agents 
were so sure of having learned the state from the endogenous vari- 
ables that they chose to hold these positions even though they could 
have avoided all uncertainty by trading, usually very close to the RE 
equil. iium price. 
4 he profits of insiders relative to the uninformed agents, sum- 
marized in table 6, reject hypothesis 3 in favor of its alternative. The 
table shows, for each period of each market, the percentage ratio of 
average realized profit per insider to the average realized profit per 
uninformed agent earned during the period. In all cases the ratios 
approach 100 as the experience in the market accumulates. The early 
"jumps" reflect first experiences with a new state. During initial pe- 
7 A table of these data is available from the authors. 
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riods insiders have the advantage. After replication, however, the 
advantages of inside information vanish completely. 
Both efficiency measures are shown for all periods of all markets in 
figures 2 through 6. To test the fourth set of hypotheses we concen- 
trate our attention on the set of periods for which the PI equilibrium 
price is different from the RE equilibrium price. This is a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the PI equilibrium allocations to be dif- 
ferent from the RE equilibrium allocations across agents classified by 
dividend distributions. 
The data in table 4 reject hypothesis 4 in favor of its alternative. 
The mean efficiencies are much closer to the RE prediction (100) than 
to the PI prediction of 57 for efficiency and -123 for trading effi- 
ciency. Chronologically, as the traders gain experience the efficiency 
measures move consistently from close to PI prediction toward the RE 
predictions. Out of 11 changes in efficiency measures repeated in 
table 4, nine changes are away from PI toward the RE prediction. The 
probability of obtaining nine out of 11 changes of the same sign by 
random chance is only 0.039. 
We can safely reject the strong RE model, the Keynes model, and 
the crystal-ball model as general models. Markets take time to adjust 
to structural changes, so the strong RE model can be rejected. After 
the RE equilibrium is established, prices adjust instantaneously in 
response to different realizations of state, but a structural change such 
as a new and unknown state of nature will not be instantaneously 
adjusted to. The necessity of adjustment time was also a finding in 
Forsythe et al. (forthcoming). The early periods of no information 
adjust closely to the expected value and not to the perfectly informed 
equilibria, so the crystal-ball hypothesis is discredited. 
Our version of Keynes can be rejected because the RE model does 
so well. If we treat any deviation from RE equilibrium price as evi- 
dence of support for the Keynes model, then the Keynes model 
deserves a closer look. During the no-information periods of the first 
three markets, prices converged to near the maximum expected 
value. In market 4 this did not happen. Prices remained well below 
the maximum expected value for the first four periods while the 
no-information condition was in effect and returned to the low levels 
in period 14 when the no-information condition was imposed again. 
The same phenomena occurred during the first three periods, the 
no-information condition of market 5. In both cases prices converge 
to an RE equilibrium price, but it is the wrong price, given the 
information. The Beja-Milgrom criticism of RE which becomes most 
relevant when no one is perfectly informed rests on the possible 
existence of exactly this type of phenomenon. 
We suspect the failure to adjust to the maximum expected value 
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resulted from the fact that no one knew that no one was informed in 
market 4. This in essence adds at least two subjective states, giving a 
total of four (X and no one knows, Y and no one knows, X with 
insiders, and Y with insiders) and thus would increase the number of 
total replications necessary for the convergence behavior. The large 
number of holdings on the "wrong" side of the market supports this 
hypothesis. For the first three periods of market 5 all agents should 
have known that no one was informed since no clue card was passed 
out as had been the case in the previous markets in which they had 
participated, nor was the method of giving clues even explained. We 
suspect, however, some possible confusion, as subjects speculated on 
the possible sources of others' information, thereby increasing the 
state space. Notice that the holdings converged to the RE pattern even 
though price had not adjusted. In summary, we suspect these unin- 
formed periods provide support for a theory of temporary equilibria 
as opposed to the possible existence of Keynesian-type phenomena. 
Given the state of the data and theory, we cannot draw any firm 
conclusions. 
The other period of interest in this regard is period 10 of experi- 
ment 1. Notice that price is increasing substantially above the ex- 
pected value prediction. In all 12 trades above the expected value the 
buyer was the same agent, and he was an insider. This individual was 
simply overly optimistic given his information. The fact that this 
unwarranted (in theory and in fact) optimum did not serve as a lure 
for uninformed individuals does not reflect well on the Keynesian 
model. This was a good opportunity for a "bubble," but one did not 
develop. 
V. Implications for Related Issues 
Formation of Rational Expectations 
Since no theoretical models predict the path (as opposed to the end 
point) of the learning process in asset markets, we cannot conduct 
formal tests of theory. In this section we provide some descriptive 
material in the hope that generation of such data may help promote 
development of dynamic models of learning in competitive asset 
markets. 
In our markets, at least two kinds of learning are identifiable. At the 
beginning of the first period of a market uninformed agents do not 
know the state, and no agent knows what the market price would be 
under any given state. From studying the static models one could 
easily infer that agents must first learn about the equilibrium price 
and net trade correspondence (the price given the state) and then 
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learn about the state from market conditions (e.g., price). Applied to 
the markets studied here this reasoning suggests that an agent must 
learn first about the structure of the dividends under various states 
and then learn about the state given the market conditions if (s)he is 
not an insider. 
In the experimental markets the two types of learning do not seem 
to occur sequentially. Instead they occur simultaneously. The profit 
data can be used to make the point. The ratio of profits of agents 
predicted by the RE model to be buyers to those of the predicted 
sellers reflects the degree of knowledge about the state-price corre- 
spondence. Insiders and uninformed agents are represented in equal 
numbers on both sides of the market (except in market 1 where three 
out of nine are insiders). Furthermore, initial endowments of (pre- 
dicted) sellers should be transferred to (predicted) buyers at prices 
approximating the value of the initial endowments of sellers and 
which afford buyers very little profit on the transaction. Therefore, 
profits of buyers and sellers might reasonably be expected to be equal 
if the equilibrium-price correspondence has been revealed and un- 
derstood. Thus, as the ratio of profits of buyers to sellers goes to one, 
we can say agents have learned the state-equilibrium-price corre- 
spondence. 
Learning about the state, given market conditions, is reflected in 
the differences between profits of insiders who are perfectly informed 
about the state (with the exception of market 1, where information is 
imperfect) and the uninformed agents. If the difference is zero (if the 
ratio is one), then the informed agents (insiders) and uninformed 
agents are equally informed. 
For each experiment the ratio of buyer and seller profits for each 
period is shown in table 7. The ratio of profits of insiders and unin- 
formed agents is shown in table 6. As can be seen, both measures 
converge to near 100 as replications occur and all agents become 
informed about both correspondences. Notice that the convergence 
occurs simultaneously. Thus, given these measuring devices, we con- 
clude that learning about the price, given the state, and learning 
about the state, given the market, occur simultaneously and not se- 
quentially, as the comparative-static models usually assume. 
Sources of Agent Information 
While these markets are simple relative to naturally occurring mar- 
kets, behavior in these markets is not simple. The results indicate that 
agents are receiving accurate information from some source, but the 
exact source could not be determined. Bids, offers, and contracts 
were all made publicly by voice interaction. All were written on the 
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TABLE 7 
RATIO OF REALIZED PROFITS OF INVESTORS PREDICTED TO BE BUYERS 
BY THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL TO THE PROFIT OF PREDICTED SELLERS 
IAkE Type of 
Period 
Market Bu s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 9 10 11 12 13 14 
I 158 149 139 141 103 
1 II 
III 153 530 
I 144 112 120 120 114 
2 II 
III 466 172 
I 164 113 103 103 
3 II 
III 160 136 129 120 114 109 
I 212 190 156 128 
4 II 
III 131 133 127 122 118 137 
I 269 134 125 
5 II 140 108 106 106 
III 139 116 106 
blackboard. The timing of activities occurred in real time, and on 
occasion curses, laughter, or other signs of emotion may have been 
detectable in spite of efforts to control it. 
From a formal point of view much more information was available 
than equilibrium prices. Thus, more information was available than is 
called for by the efficient-markets hypothesis (Grossman 1978; Jor- 
dan 1979). But it was not clear what information was used. 
In an attempt to narrow the possibilities, a questionnaire which 
inquired about the extent to which individuals could identify insiders 
was circulated after the markets. Recall that the method of distributing 
inside information did not reveal the identity of insiders. Generally, 
insiders were better than the uninformed in their ability to identify 
other insiders. Most uninformed correctly guessed at least one insider 
if their options were limited to two. We conjecture, however, that the 
ability to identify the insiders is not a necessary condition for con- 
vergence in these markets. 
The second attempt involved an analysis of bids and offers. Notice 
in markets 3, 4, and 5 that after some replications the opening 
contract is near the RE equilibrium price. Somehow information 
about the state was revealed before any trades took place. In table 8, 
the proportion of all first-market action, an opening bid or offer, 
which involved an insider is given for each market for those periods in 
which insiders exist. The proportion of times an insider is involved 
with the second, third, sixth, and eighteenth market actions is also 
given. The cumulative proportions are also given. 
In four of the five markets relative activity of insiders decreases 
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with time. It seems as though competition, evidenced by competing 
bids and offers among insiders during the opening stages of a period, 
reveals the state to the uninformed. 
The exception to the pattern, market 2, is instructive and indicates 
the limitations of the measure we present. The opening offers in 
market 2 were made by uninformed individuals. They were also 
"safe" in the sense that they would have been reasonable sales given 
that the high-price state existed (recall that in market 2 agents had 
experience with the environment under conditions of complete in- 
formation). Similarly, uninformed buyers can make safe opening 
bids. Information is revealed when someone (presumably an insider 
attempting to take advantage of the information) drops (increases) 
the offer (bid) substantially below (above) the safe levels. Thus, it is 
not simply bids and offers which convey the information, but certain 
critical bids and offers seem to convey it. Unfortunately, at this time 
we cannot identify these operationally. 
The discussion of bids, offers, trader identification, and other en- 
dogenous sources of information suggests that the trading institutions 
themselves may be important in determining the applicability of the 
RE models. Institutions can dictate the type of information available 
to participants. For example, a computerized market which masks 
bids, offers, and trader identity or even volume may not operate as 
efficiently as one which does not. The closed book of the specialist is 
certainly an institution worthy of consideration in this regard. 
Statistical Analysis of Price Changes 
Even though only single-period securities are traded in these mar- 
kets, their price data do have some properties typical of stock mar- 
kets. The price series becomes a fair game as RE equilibrium is 
established. Further, the transaction-to-transaction log price returns 
have a serial correlation very close to zero, and their density function 
is leptokurtic (fat tailed relative to the normal density function). 
The fair-game efficient-market model implies that it is not possible 
to devise trading rules based on past prices (weak-form efficiency) 
that will earn abnormally high returns on a consistent basis (Fama 
1970). We tested five trading rules: (1) buy and hold, (2) trend filter, 
(3) 1-franc filter, (4) 5-franc filter, and (5) 25-franc filter.8 For the 
8Buy and hold: Buy one certificate at opening transaction price of each period; 
liquidate at closing transaction price of the period. Trend filter: Observe transaction 
price trend from opening to current price; if positive, buy if necessary to hold one 
certificate; if negative, sell if necessary to maintain a short position of one certificate. 
Liquidate at closing transaction price. y-franc filter: If transaction price goes up byy or 
more francs, buy if necessary to hold one certificate until the price goes down by y or 
more francs, at which time sell if necessary to maintain a short position of one certificate 
until the price goes up again by y or more francs. Liquidate at closing price. 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.186 on Thu, 19 Dec 2013 15:07:49 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
EXPERIMENTAL SECURITY MARKETS 691 
TABLE 9 
PROFIT FROM MECHANICAL TRADING RULES: TESTS OF FAIR-GAME HYPOTHESIS 
t-Statistic 
of Excess Profit 
Median Mean SD over Buy and Hold 
Buy and hold 10.0 14.9 53.9 ... 
Trend filter 4.0 16.9 39.5 .36 
1-franc filter 3.0 10.5 37.7 -.75 
5-franc filter 4.0 11.1 37.4 -.64 
25-franc filter 0.0 2.1 33.8 -2.16 
Perfect information 
about RE price 10.0 26.1 40.3 2.09 
NOTF.-The data for period I of market 4 were excluded in calculating the means. 
single-period security used in these markets, equilibrium return over 
time is zero. The naive buy-and-hold strategy yields a median return 
of 10 francs per period and a mean return of 14.9 francs per period, 
which is significantly positive (see table 9). This return is generated 
during the early periods and declines to zero as RE equilibrium is 
approached. Ordinary least-squares regression of buy-and-hold re- 
turns (BHt) earned each period on the absolute difference between 
equilibrium and average trading price (dt) yields the following esti- 
mates: 
BHt=-1.86 + 0.6O9dt,R2 = .14; 
(-0.22) (3.12) 
D-W statistic = 1.94 and t-statistics are given in parentheses. The 
results suggest that the profits generated by the buy-and-hold strategy 
are largely the product of disequilibrium trading. 
Trend and 1- and 5-franc filters perform about as well as the 
buy-and-hold strategy; the 25-franc filter performs worse than the 
buy-and-hold. As equilibrium is approached, the returns from these 
filters also approach zero. 
Returns from using the perfect advance knowledge of RE equilib- 
rium price9 are given in the last row of table 9. These returns are 
equal to or greater than the buy-and-hold strategy and indicate that 
the knowledge of equilibrium price is useful for trading in this market 
even though this price is not always attained. According to the Keynes 
model this knowledge would not be useful for a single investor. 
The first-order serial correlation of log price changes (loge Pt/Pt~-) 
is very close to zero. Serial correlation in data for individual trading 
9 Any time current price is below the equilibrium price hold a long position of one 
certificate by buying at the current price if necessary; any time the current price is 
above the equilibrium level hold a short position of one certificate by selling, if neces- 
sary. 
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periods ranged from -0.65 to 0.60 with a median of 0.00 and mean 
of -0.022 (SD = 0.30). The magnitude of serial correlation does not 
seem to be affected by the existence of disequilibrium trades, as is 
indicated by the following regression of estimated serial correlation 
for each period (it) on the absolute deviation of average trading price 
from the RE equilibrium price dt: 
Pt= -0.0357 + 0.00038dt; 
(-0.83) (0.75) 
t-statistics are given in parentheses, the coefficient of determination is 
0.01, and D-W statistic is 1.91. 
The frequency distribution of relative price changes in our markets 
is leptokurtic (fat tailed) relative to the normal distribution. Sample 
kurtosis (fourth moment around mean divided by squared variance) 
in all five markets, 13.7, 19.3, 52.9, 56.3, and 30.3, respectively, is 
much greater than the kurtosis of normal distribution, which is 3. 
Relatively large proportions of observations in the peak of the dis- 
tribution of price changes derive from periods in which trading is at 
or close to the equilibrium price, while the larger price changes in the 
tails of the distribution come mostly from trading away from equilib- 
rium price. This observation might lead one to speculate that the 
leptokurtosis of security-price returns is generated by trading at 
prices far from the equilibrium price and that trading closer to the 
equilibrium price would tend to bring the distribution closer to the 
normal. However, preliminary tests on our data do not support such a 
conclusion. For each market we identified periods when much of the 
trading was and was not close to equilibrium price by visual examina- 
tion of price series and calculated the kurtosis of price changes ob- 
served in each class of periods. In three of the five markets the 
kurtosis of price changes observed in close-to-equilibrium trading 
periods alone was greater than that for far-from-equilibrium trading 
periods. 
VI. Conclusions 
Given time and replications these markets behave substantially as 
predicted by RE equilibrium models. There seems to be no doubt that 
variables endogenous to the operation of these markets served to 
convey accurately the state of nature to otherwise uninformed agents. 
We can conclude that the RE models must be taken seriously as not 
universally misleading about the nature of human capabilities and 
markets. Of course, only additional research will determine to what 
extent the experiences acquired in these simple markets can be ex- 
tended to more complicated naturally occurring markets. 
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The exact variables) which serve(s) to inform the uninformed 
about the underlying state may differ according to the structure of 
the market institutions. Market institutions differ widely according to 
the nature of the endogenous variables observable by participants. 
Thus, institutional features might have implications for both the 
existence of RE equilibria and the speed with which they are attained. 
In these double oral auctions the key variables are not yet identified, 
but we suspect a knowledge of unaccepted bids and offers, in addition 
to price, is of primary importance. 
Appendix 
Markets were conducted in three steps: (1) training with the mechanism used 
to draw states of nature, (2) explanation of procedures and rules of the 
market, (3) conduct of markets for several periods. 
Step 1: Training with Mechanisms Used to Draw the States of Nature 
Instruction Set 1 was distributed and read out loud. On the table between 
the subjects and the experimenters was kept a bingo cage with the appro- 
priate number of balls. Subjects had the opportunity to observe the opera- 
tions of the devices for many draws. Following this, subjects were asked to 
predict the outcome, with the incentive structure described in the instruc- 
tions, for about 10-20 draws until most, though not all, subjects predicted the 
state with the highest relative frequency based on the bingo-cage numbers. 
No mention was made of probabilities. 
Instruction Set 1 
Each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage containing thirty-six balls num- 
bered one through thirty-six. If the ball drawn is numbered one through 
twelve, outcome of the draw is called X; if a ball numbered thirteen through 
thirty-six is drawn, the outcome is called Y. 10 
You have to predict the outcome of each draw before it is announced. If 
your prediction is correct, you win $0.25; if wrong, you lose $0.10. Before the 
first draw is made, record your prediction by circling either X or Y in the first 
row of the enclosed sheet. After you have encircled one letter, the outcome 
will be announced and you should record the announced outcome in the 
blank space on the same row of the table. If your prediction is correct, circle 
the amount shown in the Win column, otherwise circle the amount shown in 
the Lose column. 
Once you have recorded your prediction you must not make a change; any 
erasure will invalidate your prediction. At the end, add up your total winnings 
and losses and record the difference (net winnings or losses) at the bottom 
right corner of the sheet (see fig. 7). 
Step 2: Explanation of Procedures and Rules of the Market 
Instruction Set 2 was distributed and read aloud. The experimenter illus- 
trated a sequence of hypothetical transactions on the blackboard so each 
subject would understand how transactions were to be recorded on the record 
10 The numbers in this first paragraph were altered appropriately for each experi- 
ment; see table 2 for parameters. 
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Subject No. 
Circle One Outcome Win Lose 
Number Decision X or Y ($) ($) 
1 X Y ________ 0.25 -0.10 
2 X Y 0.25 -0.10 
Total winnings 
Total losses 
Net winnings/losses _ 
Fi;. 7 
sheet and how his/her profit would be calculated. The example was designed 
to minimize its normative effect on subsequent bidding behavior. Importance 
of accurate records of all transactions was emphasized. 
Instruction Set 2 
General. -This is an experiment in the economics of market decision mak- 
ing. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The 
instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and make good 
decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid 
to you in cash. 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy 
and sell certificates in a sequence of market years. Attached to the instructions 
you will find a sheet, labeled information and record sheet, which helps 
determine the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to 
reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings 
will be in terms of francs. Each franc is worth $0.003 to you. Do not reveal this 
number to anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will be con- 
verted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. Notice that the 
more francs you earn the more dollars you earn. 
Specific Instructions 
Your profits come from two sources-from collecting certificate earnings 
on all certificates you hold at the end of the year and from buying and selling 
certificates. During each market year you are free to purchase or sell as many 
certificates as you wish, provided vou follow the rules below. For each 
certificate you hold at the end of' the year you will be given one of the two 
numbers of' francs listed on row 19 of your information and record sheet. 
Note that earnings may be different for different investors." The method 
bv which one of the two numbers is selected each year is explained later in 
these instructions. Compute your total certificate earnings for a period by 
multiplying the earnings per certificate by the number of certificates held. 
That is, (number of' certificates held) x (earnings per certificate) = total 
" In instructions for market 2, this sentence was eliminated. In market 1, it had been 
replaced bNy "Notice that these amounts may differ from period to period." 
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certificate earnings. Suppose, for example, that you hold five certificates at 
the end of year 1. If for that period your earnings are 100 francs per 
certificate (i.e., the number selected from row 19 is 100) then your total 
certificate earnings in the year would be 5 x 100 = 500 francs. This number 
should be recorded on row 19 at the end of the year. 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs on hand by the 
amount of the sale price. Similarly, purchases reduce your francs on hand by 
the amount of the purchase price. Thus you can gain or lose money on the 
purchase and resale of certificates. At the end of each year all your holdings 
are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0. 
At the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial holding of 
certificates. This is recorded on row 0 of the year's information and record 
sheet. You may sell these if you wish or you may hold them. If you hold a 
certificate, then you receive "earnings per certificate" at the end of the year. 
Notice therefore that for each certificate you hold initially, you can earn 
during the year at least the amount shown as "earnings per certificate." You 
earn this amount if you do not sell that certificate during the year. 
In addition, at the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial 
amount of francs on hand. This is also recorded on row 0 of each year's 
information and record sheet. You may keep this if you wish or you may use it 
to purchase certificates. 
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with holdings of 
certificates and francs on hand. You are free to buy and sell certificates as you 
wish according to the rules below. Your francs on hand at the end of a year 
are determined by your initial amount of francs on hand, earnings on 
certificate holdings at the end of the year, and by gains and losses from 
purchases and sales of certificates. All francs on hand at the end of a year in 
excess of 10,000 francs are yours to keep. These are your profits for the year. 
Information about Dividends 
Whether the dividend you receive from the certificates you hold is the 
X-dividend shown on row 19 or the Y-dividend on row 19 is determined by 
the experimenter at the beginning of the year by drawing a ball from a bingo 
cage containing forty balls numbered one through forty. If the ball drawn is 
numbered one through sixteen, X-dividend is paid; if the ball drawn is 
numbered seventeen through forty, Y-dividend is paid.12 
At the beginning of each year, before trading starts, each investor will 
receive a clue card which will carry one of the following three: (i) X, (ii) Y, (iii) 
a blank. If your clue card carries an X, the dividend paid at the end of that 
year will be the X-dividend; if your clue card carries a Y, Y-dividend will be 
paid. A blank card tells you nothing about whether the X or the Y dividend 
will be paid.i3 
Trading and Recording Rules 
(1) All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your sales 
or purchases you must record the TRANSACTION PRICE in the ap- 
propriate column depending on the nature of the transaction. The first 
12 States and numbers in this paragraph were altered according to parameters for 
each experiment given in table 2. 
13This paragraph describing the clue cards was not used in markets 1 and 2 and was 
altered to include state Z in market 5. 
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Trader No. 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
YEAR 
Transaction Transaction Price Certificates Francs 
Number Sale Purchase on Hand on Hand 
Beginning of the 0 
Year Holdings /////////////////////////////1 
2 
18 
X-Dividend Total Certificate Earnings 
19 Dividend Rate 
Y-Dividend on Hand at the End of the Year 
20 Total Francs on Hand at the 
End of the Year 
21 Less: Fixed Cost 
22 End of Year Net Profit 
Transfer this amount 2 
to your Profit Sheet 
Fi(;. 8 
transaction is recorded on row (1), and succeeding transactions are 
recorded on subsequent rows (see fig. 8). 
(2) After each transaction you must calculate and record your new holdings 
of certificates and your new francs on hand. Your holdings of certificates 
may never go below zero. Your francs on hand may never go below zero. 
(3) At the end of the year record your total certificate earnings in the last 
column of row 19. Compute your end of period totals on row 20 by 
listing certificate holdings and adding total certificate earnings to your 
francs on hand. 
(4) At the end of the year, subtract from your francs on hand the amount 
listed in row 21 and enter this new amount on row 22. This is your profit 
for the market year and is yours to keep. At the end of each market year, 
record this number on your profit sheet (see fig. 9). 
(5) At the end of the experiment add up your total profit on your profit 
sheet and enter this sum on row 15 of your profit sheet. To convert this 
number into dollars, multiply by the number on row 16 and record the 
product on row 17. The experimenter will pay you this amount of 
money. 
Market organization.-The market for these certificates is organized as follows. 
The market will be conducted in a series of years. Each period lasts for seven 
minutes. Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her 
hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate at a specified price, and 
anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, 
anyone wishing to sell a certificate is fiee to raise his or her hand and make a 
verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. If a bid or offer is 
accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single certificate, and the 
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PROFIT SHEET 
Row Market Year Profit 
1 1 
2 2 
14 
15 Total profit (in Crancs) 
16 Dollars per franc 0.003 
17 Total dollars profit 
Name 
Fic. 9 
contracting parties will record the transaction on their information and record 
sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptance will be resolved by random choice. 
Except for the bids and their acceptance, you are not to speak to any other 
subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are 
free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
Step 3: Conduct of Markets 
Seven minutes were permitted for each period, with warnings at five minutes, 
six minutes, and six-and-a-half minutes. In markets 1, 2, and 5 information 
cards were not distributed in no-information periods. In markets 3 and 4 
blank information cards were distributed in no-information periods. These 
information cards were distributed at the beginning of each period. The 
bingo cage was rotated in full view of the subjects, a ball was drawn, and the 
appropriate information cards (prepared in advance) were distributed. A log 
of bids, offers, and transactions of the latest four or five was kept on the 
blackboard. In market 5 a photocopy of the log of each period was distributed 
to subjects at the end of each period. 
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